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How do differences in the local business environment influence location of 
industry within countries? How do the benefits of a good business environment 
compare to those from good market access and agglomeration economies from 
industry clustering? We examine these questions by analyzing location decisions 
of individual firms. Using data from a recently completed survey of 
manufacturing firms in India, we find that both the local business environment 
and agglomeration economies significantly influence business location choices 
across cities. In particular, excessive regulation of labor and of other industrial 
activities reduces the probability of a business locating in a city. Our findings 
imply that in order to attract industrial activity, smaller or remoter cities need to 
offer even more attractive policy concessions or reforms in order to offset the 
effects of their relatively adverse (economic) geography. Our methodology pays 
special attention to the identification of agglomeration economies in the presence 
of unobserved sources of natural advantage. 
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1  Introduction 
 
How do differences in the local business environment influence location of industry 
within countries? How do the benefits of a good business environment compare to 
benefits from good market access and agglomeration economies from industry 
clustering? And, can improvements in the local business environment enhance industrial 
activity in geographically (and historically) disadvantaged cities? Finding answers to 
these questions is important for assessing the role of local policies or interventions in 
terms of influencing investment flows and industrial activity, particularly in small and 
medium sized cities. To examine these questions, we start from micro-foundations by 
analyzing location decisions of individual firms.  
 
We follow a modeling approach to evaluate what factors matter when a firm is 
considering a location to start production. Using firm level data collected in the 2003 
round of the Investment Climate Survey (ICS) for India, we find that the local business 
environment has a significant bearing on location decisions. Predatory enforcement of 
business regulations reduces the probability of a business locating in a city. In 
comparison, better access to finance and to land and greater availability of infrastructure 
attract firms to a city. However, firms are also attracted by agglomeration economies 
from clustering of firms in their own industry. This means that new firms will choose to 
locate production in areas that are already established centers in their line of business. As 
a result cities that cannot offer the benefit of agglomeration economies to potential 
entrants may have to offer an even better policy environment to compensate for 
deficiencies in their economic geography.   3
 
An important methodological challenge in the estimation of the location decision 
model is to identify the effect of local agglomeration economies in the presence of 
unobservable sources of “natural advantage” that could make firms locate near one 
another even when there are no productivity gains from clustering.
1  In this case, it would 
not be possible to infer the presence of agglomeration economies only by looking at the 
number of firms of a given industry in a locality. It could be that the firms have clustered 
in order to reap benefits from their proximity to one another. However, it is also possible 
clustering could signify that these firms are drawn by a set of unobservable attributes of 
the locality. This endogeneity problem is particularly serious where cross section data are 
used in the analysis. We address this problem by using historic land revenue institutions 
as instruments, and find that our results on agglomeration economies are robust across 
model specifications. The institutions were exogenously set up during the British colonial 
rule, and have been found to influence agriculture investment, productivity and general 
district level development indicators in the post independence period [Banerjee and Iyer, 
2005]. We find that differences in land revenue institutional arrangements also have 
implications for industrialization prospects of cities.  
 
This paper makes several contributions to the literatures on urban and industrial 
development. First, there are only a handful of papers that examine location of industry 
within developing countries. Some of these papers have looked at the role of economic 
geography or agglomeration economies [Amiti and Cameron, 2004; Amiti and Javorcek, 
2005; Henderson and Kuncoro, 1996; Lall and Chakravorty, 2005], but very few have 
                                                 
1 This issue was brought into prominence in Ellison and Glaeser [1997].   4
carefully examined the impacts of the local business environment [Deichmann et. al., 
2005; Head and Reis, 1996].
2 We estimate the relative importance of agglomeration 
economies and the business environment using a rich set of policy relevant variables. 
Second, we address the problem of identification of agglomeration economies just 
described. Third, the policy implications of our findings are quite significant. The finding 
that agglomeration economies and the local business environment jointly influence 
business location decisions implies that smaller or remote cities need to offer more a 
business friendly policy environment than more geographically advantaged locations. 
While geography is certainly not destiny, incremental policy reforms could be 
overwhelmed by adverse economic geography. 
 
This paper proceeds in five sections. In Section II, we discuss the measurement of 
business environment and industrial clustering. We set out the analytic framework and 
discuss econometric issues in Section III. We present estimation results in Section IV. 
We summarize and conclude in Section V. 
 
2  The local business environment and agglomeration economies 
 
There are two broad approaches to identifying influences on firm location decisions: One 
is a survey-based or the “stated preference” approach, which asks decision makers what 
location factors are important to them. The second is a modeling approach used to 
identify the “revealed preference” based on site/region characteristics. Several factors, 
with some overlap, have been identified in the literature using these two approaches (see 
                                                 
 
2 Deichmann et al. [2005] estimate the importance of both agglomeration economies and local business 
conditions, but their measures of business environment only capture aspects of predatory taxation. 
   5
Calzonetti and Walker [1991], McCann [1998], Deichmann et. al [2005], Hanushek and 
Song [1978], Webber [1984]). These include  
(a)   “Business environment”, which includes access to inputs (quality and cost of 
labor and capital); provision of basic infrastructure; local regulations; 
institutional environment; and industry-specific subsidies or tax breaks; 
(b)  “Agglomeration economies” from industry clustering, which include external 
economies provided by localization and urbanization.   
 
In this section, we discuss both sets of factors, with particular emphasis on their 
relative performance across Indian cities and states. In the next section, we provide the 
estimation strategy to evaluate the relative importance of these factors in influencing firm 
location decisions.   
 
A.  Business Environment  
 
The importance of the business environment or investment climate, as it is alternatively 
called, has been brought into prominence in a recent World Bank report [World Bank, 
2005].
3 Based on a survey of approximately 30,000 firms across 53 developing countries 
this report documents the effects on economic performance from deficiencies in a 
country’s investment climate. We complement this work by examining the impacts of 
deficiencies in various aspects of the business environment
4 on distribution of economic 
activities across cities and regions within a large country. Although the term business 
environment includes a wide range of policies affecting the economic setting of firms, we 
                                                 
3 The report is entitled: World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone. 
4 We use the terms business environment and investment climate interchangeably.   6
narrow our focus to three aspects that show large variation across cities and regions in 
India and many large developing economies such as China and Brazil.
5 These are: (1) 
Regulatory quality; (2) Provision of Infrastructure; and (3) Access to primary inputs, 





In this paper we focus on two aspects of regulatory quality businesses in India face today. 
These are: (a) the degree of labor regulations, (b) and the intrusiveness or predatory 
nature of the administration of general business regulations. 
 
Labor regulation: Excessive regulation of industrial relations is often singled out as a 
major drag on the international competitiveness of many of India’s labor-intensive 
industries [World Bank 2004]. The link between industrial exit barriers and labor 
regulation stems from the employment security provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 
of 1947.  This act sets out the rules for settlement of employment termination disputes. 
One of its main provisions requires establishments with more than 100 workers to secure 
state government permission before plant closure or a retrenchment of workers; critics 
point out that permission is rarely granted [Sachs et al., 1999]. This has added to the 
protraction of insolvency procedures.  
 
                                                 
5 Although issues of macroeconomic stabilization and taxation are key aspects of the business environment 
and are of considerable concern when the comparison is across countries, these are of lower importance 
when we compare investment choices within countries.  We would have also liked to examine urban 
governance and management, but don’t have reliable and comparable measures of these variables across 
Indian cities.   7
The provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act have also combined with other 
pieces of labor legislation to inhibit the exploitation of economies of scale in industry by 
reducing the flexibility firms need to respond to changes in market conditions. These 
include the “service rules” provisions of the Industrial Employment Act of 1946 and 
those of the Contract Labor (Abolition and Regulation) Act of 1970. The Industrial 
Employment Act provides for the definition of job content, employee status, and work 
area by state law or by collective agreement, after which changes would not be made 
without getting the consent of all workers.  Zagha [1999] points out that the 1946 act has 
always made it difficult for businesses “to shift workers not only between plants and 
locations, but also between different jobs in the same plant.” As a way around such 
restrictions, businesses may resort to contract workers, whose hiring is governed by the 
Contract Labor Act. This act gives state governments the right to abolish contract labor in 
any industry in any part of the state. In states where recourse to contract labor has been 
more restricted as a result, keeping employment below the threshold level of 100 
employees or contracting out jobs has been the only way of maintaining flexibility in the 
allocation of manpower. 
 
In our analysis, we examine how labor regulations influence location decisions of 
businesses, using indicators of labor regulations developed by Besley and Burgess 
[2004]. They examine state level amendments between 1958 and 1992 to the Industrial 
Disputes Act of 1947
6 and code these amendments as being pro-worker, neutral, or pro-
business. States with pro labor regulations have higher number of workdays lost due to 
                                                 
 
6 This regulation was passed by the central government, but individual states have the right to  amend it to 
facilitate implementation or suit it to local conditions   8
strikes and lockouts, and they find that pro labor regulation has reduced manufacturing 
output per capita, and also moved economic activity from registered to unregistered 
manufacturing (which are not subject to labor regulations).  For the purpose of the 
estimation, we recode pro worker regulations as 1 and neutral or pro business regulations 
as 0. 
 
Administration of general business regulations: In addition to its role in regulating 
business startups, business closures, and industrial relations, the government routinely 
comes face to face with private industry through its customs inspectors, tax officials, and 
those enforcing a variety of health, safety, and environmental standards that apply to all 
establishments employing 10 workers or more. These standards are set out in several 
pieces of legislation, including the Factories Act of 1948, the Water Act of 1974, the Air 
Act of 1981, and the Environmental Protection Act of 1986.
7 Although these are in 
essence federal laws, their administration is mainly the responsibility of state 
governments, which have considerable discretion in enforcement.
8 State inspectors are 
the chief enforcers through their routine visits to business premises, and have the power 
to suspend plant operations, if necessary, for inspection purposes. 
 
These inspections are designed to enforce many rules and regulations that are 
likely not much different from those implemented on a routine basis by governments in 
developed economies.  There is, however, an important difference. In India, as in many 
                                                 
7 More specialized standards are set in a number of statues such as the Building and Constructions Act, the 
Mines Safety Act, and the Child Labour Act.  
8 For example, the government of Tamil Nadu exempts the software producers from the provisions of the 
Factories Act as long as they do not engage manufacturing activities.   9
other developing countries, individual government officers seem to have considerable 
discretion in deciding which rules to enforce, on whom, when, and, sometimes, how. In 
many cases inspection visits are arbitrary or excessive, and are viewed by business 
owners as punitive, or as a veiled demand for bribes. Often the latter is a price worth 
paying for avoiding the disruption to production plans or the loss of staff time that more 
frequent or more intrusive visits would otherwise bring about.  
 
A useful proxy of the cost of imposed by predatory administration or enforcement 
of regulations is the frequency of visits that government officials make to business 
premises. On average, inspectors visit factories around 10 times each year to see if they 
comply with various regulations. These include taxes (sales tax, income tax, customs, and 
excise duty), labour and social security; fire and building safety; and environment 
regulations. Regulator visits, however, vary considerably across cities and states (see 
Figure 1). On average, firms in cities such as Delhi, Gurgaon, Chandigarh and Nagpur 
report less than 5 regulator visits per year. On the other hand, firms in Chennai report 17 
visits, Mumbai 15, Ahmedabad 16, and Cochin 19 visits.   
 
Provision of Infrastructure 
 
 
Utilities: The investment climate survey (ICS) data show that over 30 percent of Indian 
firms find power supply to be the most important infrastructure bottleneck or obstacle to 
growth.. India’s present difficulties with power supply (shortages, costs, unreliability) 
stem more from transmission and distribution deficiencies than from generation. In the 
analysis of the next section, we use the frequency of outages as our indicator of the quality   10
of power supply in terms of shortages or unreliability. World Bank [2004] shows that for the 
average business in India, power outages occur almost every other day. In contrast, outages 
occur once every two weeks in China and once a week in Brazil. There is also significant 
variation in this indicator within India itself. On average, cities such as Surat, Ahmedabad, 
Nagpur, Nashik , Mumbai  and Calcutta /Howrah experience less than 5 power outages each 
month. On the other end, cities in the North such as Jalandhar, Ludhiana (Punjab), Gurgaon 
and Faridabad (Haryana) and Ghaziabad and Noida (U.P) experience more than 20 outages 
a month.  
  As a result of the high frequency of power outages, the average manufacturer in 
India loses 8.4 percent a year in sales compared with less than 2 percent for the average 
manufacturer in China or Brazil. Outages can lead to loss of sales by forcing downtime (or 
idle capacity) on managers. They can also cause waste of materials. This happens when 
power disruptions cause damage to materials in process—materials that cannot be used 
when power and thus production resumes. Power disruptions also damage equipment, 
adding maintenance and repair costs that are directly attributable to the outages. 
 
Transport: In addition to examining bottlenecks in power supply, we calculate travel times 
from each city to the closest port to examine if proximity to transhipment hubs and output 
markets influence the location decisions of manufacturing firms. In addition to the direct 
effects on facilitating access to markets (both national and international), transshipment 
nodes (such as ports) have historically been important in the evolution of urban centers. 
In fact, through path dependency such urban centers continue to be prosperous (and 
efficient) even after the initial advantage of the hub access becomes irrelevant (Fujita and 
Mori, 1996).    11
 
 
Access to inputs 
 
Land: Several land market distortions in Indian cities have limited firm entry and exit as 
well as the competitiveness of Indian industry. These include (a) unclear land ownership, 
(b) widespread institutional ownership of land, (c) inflexible land use and property rights, 
and (d) high transaction costs in the form of stamp duties. A recent report by the McKinsey 
Global Institute [McKinsey 2001] reports that land market distortions account for 1.3 
percent of lost growth per year in India.  These constraints have combined to create high 
land prices for businesses and households. Distortions in the land market in India have 
produced escalating land costs relative to per capita incomes. For example, relative land 
costs in New Delhi are 80 percent higher than those in Tokyo, Singapore, Jakarta, and Seoul 
[World Bank 2004].  
 
  About 90% of land parcels are subject to disputes over ownership, which take 
decades to settle in court. Subsidized user charges for water and power, low property tax 
rates, and ineffective tax collection leave local governments unable to recover investments 
in infrastructure. Inflexible land use (created by zoning difficulties and land conversion 
regulations) freezes land that would otherwise be available for development and affects 
economic entry and exit. Zoning changes involve long and cumbersome procedures 
resulting in pockets of “dead land.” For instance, obsolete cotton mills in Mumbai and 
Ahmedabad dominate huge land parcels in central locations; it is neither environmentally 
desirable nor economically feasible to put these mills back into operation. But still the mills 
stand. Businesses cannot sell their assets and reinvest in other activities, and new businesses 
cannot build in these desirable locations.    12
 
  In the empirical analysis, we use state level stamp duty rates as an a summary 
indicator of such problems in access to land. Stamp duties are currently high in India, at 8-
10% of the value of property changing hands. One effect they have is to reduce the supply 
of land on the market by discouraging land transactions. High stamp duty also provides 
incentives to grossly under-declare the real value of land. This in turn adversely affects 
the use of land as collateral for construction financing. (see Alm et. al [2004] for a 
discussion on the distortionary effects of stamp duties). Among states, there are 
considerable inter-state variations in stamp duty rates. For example, a hypothetical property 
valued at Rs. 1 million would be liable to pay as stamp duty Rs. 50,000 in Andhra Pradesh, 
Rs. 125,000 in Haryana, Rs. 38,750 in Maharashtra, and Rs. 145,000 in Uttar Pradesh.  
 
Finance:  Approximately 27 percent of firms in the ICS rate access to finance as a major 
to severe obstacle to business operations or growth. For the analysis in this paper, we use 
data on industrial credit availability, measured as the per capita lending to local industry 
by financial institutions. This is derived from the publication “Profiles of Districts” 
(CMIE), and is defined as the per capita bank credit to industries derived from the 
information on scheduled commercial bank branches, deposits and credits 
 
  Even during their initial phase, Indian SMEs have traditionally relied much more on 
debt financing—from banks and nonbank financial institutions (NBFIs)—than their 
counterparts elsewhere. But the shrinkage of the NBFI sector in response to policy and 
regulatory changes since 1997 has meant that SMEs no longer have access to finance from 
this source. And bank credit to SMEs has also dropped sharply since 1997. The limited debt   13
financing available to Indian SMEs is of a short maturity (less than one year) and is 
relatively costly compared with their counterparts in other countries.
9  
 
In large part, the financing constraint faced by SMEs may be attributed to credit 
market imperfections, resulting in high transactions costs and default risk associated with 
bank lending to SMEs. Specific problems include: (a) insufficient credit information on 
SMEs; (b) poor SME credit-assessment practices and poor lending technologies, such as 
inadequate use of credit scoring/rating tools; and (c) problems in using land as collateral and 
nonrecognition by lenders of other types of collateral, difficulty in collateral enforcement 
and loan recovery, and a bankruptcy framework that prevents easy exits for troubled firms. 
A fourth possible contributor is the degree of confidence lenders have in courts contract 
enforcement mechanisms.  
 
 
B.  Agglomeration Economies 
 
 
Agglomeration economies are production related externalities that directly affect the 
firm’s microeconomic decision making. Most fundamentally, clusters of firms that are 
predominantly in the same sector take advantage of so-called localization economies. 
They include sharing of sector specific inputs, skilled labor and knowledge, intra-industry 
linkages, and opportunities for efficient subcontracting. Marshall-Arrow-Romer 
[Marshall 1890, Romer 1986] externalities suggest that cost-saving externalities are 
maximized when a local industry is specialized. These models predict that these 
                                                 
 
9 An alternative indicator of the ease of access to formal sector external finance is the proportion of small 
businesses that have active bank credit lines or overdraft facilities -- approximately 54 percent of small 
businesses in the India ICS sample belong to this group. This is much higher relative to China but lower 
than Brazil’s by about 50 percent.   14
externalities predominantly occur within the same industry. Therefore, if an industry is 
subject to such externalities, firms are likely to locate in a few regions where other 
producers of that industry are already clustered.  
 
At the next level, inter-industry linkages in the form of buyer-supplier 
relationships may complement intra-industry externality effects. Empirically, the 
distinction between own-industry versus cross-industry linkages depends on the level of 
sectoral aggregation. At the two-digit industry code level, many activities are considered 
internal to the sector that would be classified as cross-sectoral using a three-digit 
classification. So at high sectoral aggregation, an input-output table, which summarizes 
buyer-supplier linkages between sectors, will show flows of goods as diagonal table 
elements, which would be off-diagonal inter-industry interactions in a less aggregated 
sectoral classification. Venables [1996] shows that agglomeration can occur through the 
combination of firm location decisions and buyer-supplier linkages even without high 
factor mobility. For an industry heavily dependent on intermediate goods and services as 
inputs to production, access to suppliers lowers transaction costs and increases 
profitability. Inter-industry linkages can also serve as a channel for vital information 
transfers. Firms that are linked through stable buyer-supplier chains exchange ideas on 
how to improve the quality of their products or on how to realize cost savings. It is such 
on-going interaction that makes the dynamics of inter-industry externalities so vibrant 
and reinforces the localization process.
10 
                                                 
10 At a third level, a larger overall size of the urban agglomeration and its more diverse industry mix is 
thought to provide external benefits beyond those realized within a single sector or a tight buyer-supplier 
network (Henderson 2003). These benefits are typically called urbanization economies. Larger cities have a 
greater diversity of firms. This allows greater specialization since it enables small, innovative firms to   15
 
  Own industry concentration 
 
Several different metrics of localization have been employed by agglomeration 
studies including single industry employment in a region, same industry establishments in 
a region, or an index of concentration that indicates disproportionate specialization of the 
region in the industry when compared to the nation. Measures such as single industry 
employment and the location quotient, an indicator of specialization, have been 
commonly used in empirical studies, but are problematic because they do not account for 
local differences in the industry’s firm-size distribution.  Single industry employment in a 
particular region may be due to common location of several similar firms or a single firm 
with many workers and the conventional measures treat both circumstances equally.  
Localization economies require interaction between firms so a more appropriate measure 
should recognize the importance of the number of firms in addition to the number of 
workers in an industry because both these factors affect the scope and scale of 
interaction.  
 
For the analysis in this paper, we develop a measure of own industry 
concentration that adjusts industry employment in each region for the industry’s local 
firm-size distribution. This measure  ri e ~ is firm-size adjusted employment for industry i in 
city r, and is defined as:  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
access a larger pool of potential buyers and complementary services that cannot be provided in-house. 
Larger cities also provide a larger home market for end products, make it easier to attract skilled employees 
who are attracted by urban amenities not available in smaller towns, and support a large number of 
complementary service providers such as financial and legal advisers, advertising and real estate services. 
Manufacturing firms will also require complementary services such as legal, financial and other advisory 
services. These are likely to be available in larger, more diverse urban areas. 
   16
(1)  () ri ri ri h e e − = 1 ~   
 
 
where  ∑ = =
n
j ij ri z h
1
2  is the Herfindahl index for industry i in region r and is calculated as 
the sum of squared firm shares of local industry employment and  ri e  is industry i’s  
employment in city r.  Multiplying raw industry employment by  ) 1 ( ri h −  has the desired 
effect of penalizing regions that have “lumpy” industry employment, that is, few firms 
with many workers.   
To illustrate the importance of controlling for firm-size distribution in the 
measurement of localization potential, let us consider the following two-region example. 
Total single industry employment in Region 1 is 200, distributed evenly across 10 firms. 
In this case, the Herfindahl index is 0.1 and adjusted employment  i 1 e ~  is 180.  The 
adjusted employment showing localization potential is nearly the same as pure 
employment, reflecting the considerable possibility for firm interaction. In comparison, 
total industry employment in Region 2 is also 200, but distributed between two firms, 
with the first firm having 180 employees and the other firm with 20 employees. In this 
case, the Herfindahl is 0.82, and the adjusted employment  i 2 e ~  is 36. This example shows 
that a fewer number of firms and ‘lumpy’ employment in one firm reduces the overall 
potential for localization economies. Thus, our measure  ri e ~  penalizes regions where 
employment is concentrated in a few firms. For the analysis, we calculate own industry 
concentration using employment and firm-size distribution statistics provided in the 
1998–99 sampling frame of the ASI, which provides employment data on the universe of 
registered industrial establishments in India.   17
3  Estimation Framework  
 
The objective of the empirical analysis is to evaluate the relative importance of 
the business environment and agglomeration economies in influencing location decisions 
of manufacturing firms across Indian cities. Here, we provide an estimation framework, 
where individual firms compare potential profitability across cities in India.  We assume 
that a firm evaluates potential profits at alternative locations at each time period, and 
would consider relocation if profits in another place exceeded its profits at the current 
location. By viewing past location decisions as being under constant review by firms, this 
framework allows us to investigate what location benefits are embedded in the firm’s 
current production technology.  
 
A.  Estimation Framework 
The units of observation in our analysis are all firms covered in the Investment 
Climate Survey. The underlying location decision model for each firm determines profits 
as a function of observable attributes of the business environment and agglomeration 
economies, and a set of unobserved local attributes of the city. In the model profits π 
earned by firm i, in industry k, which chooses to locate in city j are:
 11 
 
(2)  ) ; , , , , , ( , , , , , k k j i j j j j k j k j i W A IN R f β η σ π =  
Agglomeration effects that provide production externalities are represented by σj,k 
(localization economies), measured as the own industry concentration of industry i in city 
                                                 
11 This model is an adaptation of the Bayer and Timmis [2003] equilibrium model of location choice to the 
problem of industrial development.   18
j, as described in equation (1). Rj measures regulatory quality, various aspects of the 
business environment, INj represents the quality and availability of infrastructure; and Aj 
represents access to inputs such as industrial finance and land. These three sets of 
variables represent the local business environment. Wj represents labor costs 
(manufacturing wages) in city j.  
We choose the following functional form for this profit function: 
(3)  k j i j k W j k A j k IN j k R k j k k k j i W A IN R , , , , , , , , , 0 , , η β β β β σ β β π σ + + + + + + =  
 




j π π ≥  for all l, where l indexes all the possible 
city choices to ith firm.  For estimation we will assume that η i,j is additively separable 
from the rest of the utility function, and has a Weibull distribution.  The result is that we 
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In our estimation, we are assuming that each firm takes attributes associated with 
each city as given and make rational location choice decisions.  For the purpose of 
estimation this assumption translates into a condition where the idiosyncratic error term is 
independent of the city characteristics.  
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We make one addition to the specification in equation 3. The  j β ’s for 
} , , , , { W A IN R j σ ∈  in equation 3 are the parameters of the profit function with respect to 
each of these characteristics. We believe, however, that firms with multiple 
establishments value location based amenities differently relative to single establishment 
firms [Baldwin 1995, 1998]. For instance, factories or establishments belonging to a 
multi establishment firm may be able to source intermediates from their sibling 
establishments, and thereby rely less on horizontal linkages with other firms. Similarly, 
larger firms may be able to afford specialized services of lawyers who can handle 
regulatory problems for multiple establishments. However, the extent to which this 
makes a difference is an empirical question. Therefore in our analysis, we allow each 
firm’s valuation of the choice set to vary with its status of being a single establishment 
entity or a branch plant. Including this component of the profit function that varies 
between branch plants and independent establishments: 
 




r rj k j k j i Z , ,
1
, , , η β θ π ∑
=
+ + =  
We estimate the model in two stages.  First, we construct a set of industry-specific 
likelihood functions based on equations (4) and (5), and estimate a conditional logit 
model to recover estimates of  k j, θ , k = 1, 2, …, K. In the second stage, we take the 
estimated value of the choice specific constant or city specific premium,  k j, ˆ θ , and 
estimate the following regression: 
   20
(6)     j k W j k A j k IN j k R k j k k j W A IN R , , , , , , 0 , ˆ β β β β σ β β θ σ + + + + + =  
 
We organize industries into four types (ks), based on a classification developed in 
Lall [1999].  At one end of the spectrum are what resource based industries, involving 
primary processing of agricultural products and natural resources. This sector includes 
the food and tobacco industries, wood processing, tanneries, and precious stones. 
Although most industries in this sector are relatively labor intensive, their distinguishing 
characteristic in the context of trade is that the competitiveness of a locality or a country 
in their production stems from the availability of specific natural resources. Relatively 
labor intensive, low-entry barrier industries in which competitiveness depends more on 
the relative price of unskilled labor than on the cost of raw materials constitute low tech 
industries, including textiles, garments, leather goods, furniture and fabricated metal 
products. Then there are the medium or high technology industries that are as a rule more 
capital and skill intensive and, more importantly, are characterized significant to large R 
& D expenditure that also make entry costs concomitantly higher. Our grouping of 
industries based on this classification is provided in Appendix 2.   
 
C.  Identification of agglomeration economies 
 
 
We just described a model of firm location choice, where a firm chooses a 
location for production based on its valuation of the local business environment and 
agglomeration economies derived from own industry concentration. The choice of 
variables described in Section II is derived from theoretical priors and various empirical 
studies. However, in addition to these observed attributes, it is possible that firms also   21
optimize their decision based on a set of unobserved attributes, i.e those that are 
considered by the entrepreneur but not observed in the data. In the presence of these 
unobservable attributes, Equation (6) is modified as follows: 
 
(7)    k j j k W j k A j k IN j k R k j k k j W A IN R , , , , , , , 0 , ˆ ξ β β β β σ β β θ σ + + + + + + =  
 
Where ξj,k represents unobserved characteristics of the city that influences a firm’s 
location choice. Presence of these unobservable local attributes complicates the 
estimation procedure, particularly in identifying the contribution of production 
externalities to the location decisions of firms. Ellison and Glaeser [1997] point out that 
the effects of unobservable sources of “natural advantage” (i.e., positive values of ξj,k) 
will not be separately identified from those of production externalities between firms that 
arise simply from firms locating near one another. Simply including the number of firms 
or employment in a particular industry, which is a commonly used indicator in empirical 
studies evaluating localization economies, will not allow us to distinguish whether firms 
are attracted by a common unobservable, whether they derive benefits from being located 
in close proximity to one another, or whether it is some combination of the two. 
 
If we had access to panel data, we would have been able to difference out the 
effects of unobservables,
12 and then get unbiased estimates of own industry clustering. 
With cross section data, we need to find instruments that are good predictors of current 
industry concentration, but not correlated with unobservable sources of natural 
advantage. Often used instruments such as deeply lagged values of industry concentration 
                                                 
12 We are assuming that these unobservable attributes don’t change over time.   22
are not satisfactory for this purpose. For example, unobserved factors that influenced 
industry location decisions 30 years ago could still matter for industry location decisions 
today.  
 
In our quest for appropriate instruments we examine if exogenously established 
historical institutions set into place a process of path dependence that has implications for 
present day industrial development. For this, we draw on Banerjee and Iyer’s [2005] 
research on colonial land tenure and revenue systems in India, where they study the 
different land revenue systems instituted through the British colonial rule of India during 
the early nineteenth century, and examine its impact on a variety of present day economic 
and social indicators. Land revenue was the most important source of government 
revenue, and the British instituted three systems defining who was responsible for paying 
the land taxes. These were (a) landlord based systems (zamindari or malguzari), 
individual cultivator-based systems (raiyatwari) or village-based systems (mahalwari).
13  
 
Banerjee and Iyer (2005) find that post independence agricultural investments and 
productivity were lower in districts where land rights were given to landlords compared 
to districts were rights were given to cultivators. They show the effects of ‘institutional 
overhang’ on economic performance because while these land revenue institutions 
established during the British colonial rule ended with Indian independence, their effects 
are observed much later in history.  
 
                                                 
13 In landlord-based systems, the landlord was responsible for collecting revenues from a number of 
villages after retaining part of the revenue he collected; in individual-based systems British government 
officers collected revenue directly from cultivators; and in village-based systems, a village community 
body bore the responsibility for revenue collection.   23
Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) study of historic land tenure institutions and 
agricultural performance is of interest to our analysis for three reasons. First, the British 
decision on which land tenure system to adopt depended more on the preferences of 
individual administrators rather than a systematic evaluation of region specific 
characteristics.
14 Thus the choice of institutional arrangement is largely exogenous to 
regional attributes. Second, landlords were allowed to extract as much as they wanted 
from their tenants, thus making their behavior predatory, leading to high inequality and 
low general investment in their districts. Further, as most wealthy landlords were not 
cultivators themselves, this reduced pressure on the state to deliver services important to 
farmers as well as general public goods. The consequences of this system are observed in 
terms of lower education and health infrastructure and outcomes. Third, rural institutions 
have considerable bearing on urban and industrial development (Rao and Woolcock 
2001). Rural class structures and social networks do not disappear once people move to 
cities. In fact, rural or origin based identities are even stronger as people sort themselves 
into homogenous groups within heterogeneous settings.  
 
We link Banerjee and Iyer’s (2005) land revenue classification with the 1991 
district boundaries using geographic information system (GIS) based matching. For the 
analysis, we use the land revenue system of the district where the city is located and 
assign that value to the city. We then identify the cities whose districts had landlord 
based/ zamindari systems and recode these as 1 and code other cities with a 0. Thus, we 
end up with a binary measure of landlord control. To examine if there is any association 
                                                 
14 Banerjee and Iyer note that these decisions were often based on not much more than instincts of 
administrators.    24
between landlord control and industry employment, we compare average (firm size 
adjusted) industry employment in our three industry categories in landlord and non-
landlord districts (Table 3). We find significantly lower levels of industry concentration 
in landlord districts for all industry types. This suggests that the differences between 
these two categories is not simply an industry composition effect, but truly reflects lower 
levels of industrial activity in landlord districts. We also ran OLS estimations and find 
that having a historic landlord based land revenue system is negatively associated with 
industry concentration.  
 
 
4  Results  
 
A.  Data 
 
To estimate the models set out in the preceding section, we have combined 
industry survey data from the World Bank’s Investment Climate Survey (ICS) of India 
along with establishment level data from the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI).
15 The 
ICS survey was conducted from March to July 2003 on a random selection of 1,860 
manufacturing establishments sampled from 40 cities in 12 of India’s 14 major states.
16  
A list of cities covered in the ICS is provided in Appendix 1. These cities are 
representative of the main industrial centers in the country as each state is represented by 
its top 3 or 4 industrial cities accounting for the bulk of its manufacturing Gross State 
Domestic Product (GSDP). These 12 states themselves account for 94 % of India's 
                                                 
15 The World Bank and the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) have jointly carried out the ICS, and the 
Indian Central Statistical Office annually carries out the ASI. The ASI covers factories registered under 
sections 2m(i) and 2m(ii) of the Factories Act 1948, employing 10 or more workers and using power, and 
those employing 20 or more workers but not using power on any day of the preceding 12 months. 
16 These are Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Mahrashtra, 
Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. 
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Industrial GDP. Based on shares in aggregate sectoral output, the sample was largely 
drawn from eight manufacturing sectors: garments, textiles, leather, drugs and 
pharmaceutical, electronic goods and equipment, electrical white goods, auto parts, and 
food processing. 
 
To complement the ICS data, we use employment statistics provided in the 1998-
99 sampling frame of the ASI, which provides employment data on the universe of 
registered industrial establishments in India. We aggregate plant level employment to 
create measures of agglomeration economies.  Table 1 lists the variables used in our 
empirical estimation along with their sources and summary statistics. 
 
B.  Factors Influencing Firm Location Decisions  
 
We first estimate Equation (5) to recover industry specific city premiums and also 
the estimates of differences in valuation between branch plants and single establishment 
firms. We do not report the industry-city specific premiums here, but these are available 
on request. Let us first examine if multi establishment firms value location-based 
attributes any differently from single establishment firms. These results are reported in 
Table 2.  These coefficients are difficult to interpret as they indicate the preference of 
multi establishment firms for characteristics of a city relative to single establishment 
firms. Interactions between multi establishment firms and city characteristics for all 
industry types are jointly significant. However, only few of the estimated coefficients are 
individually significant. There are two variables where multi-establishment firms across 
industry types are more sensitive to the local business environment. These are proximity 
to an international port and effective stamp duty rates.    26
 
Now, let us turn to interpreting results from estimating Equation (6), which 
explains variations in city-industry specific premiums. Estimated coefficients are 
provided Table 3. We have organized the findings around the relative importance of the 
business environment and agglomeration economies/ clustering. Columns 1, 2, and 3 in 





Labor regulations: We find that across industries, the coefficient for labor regulation is 
negative and significant, which implies that cities located in states that have passed pro 
labor regulations have lower attractiveness in terms of location decisions of 
manufacturing firms.  These effects are stronger for high technology manufacturing.  Our 
findings are consistent with those from Dollar, Iarossi and Mengistae (2002), who survey 
1000 manufacturing establishments from 10 Indian states and find that that managers 
would be willing to reduce their work force by 16-17 percent if there was greater labor 
market flexibility, indicating the negative impact of labor regulation on firm productivity. 
The negative impact of labor regulations on formal sector manufacturing is also seen in 
cross-country evidence. For example, Botero et. al. (2004) study labor regulations in 85 
countries and find that heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial 
economy.  
   27
Enforcement of business regulations: In terms of predatory enforcement of business 
regulations, we find that the frequency of visits by inspectors to plants in each city has a 
significant negative effect on the attractiveness of a city for investment in all broad 
sectors.  As both city attractiveness (θ ˆ ) and inspector visits are in logs, the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. For example, in low technology firms, the 
coefficient of –0.66 means that a 10 percent increase in the frequency of inspection visits 
reduces a city’s investment attractiveness by 6.6 percent. The effects are relatively 
stronger for high technology manufacturing.  
 
Utilities: We find that the frequency of power outages has a significant negative effect on 
a city’s investment attractiveness. This finding is consistent for all industry types, and 
stronger for high technology manufacturing. For these firms, the coefficient of –0.29 
means that a 10 percent increase in the frequency of power outages reduces a city’s 
investment attractiveness by 2.9 percent. The negative impact of utility failures is 
consistent with Mani et. al. [1997], who also find negative effects of state level power 
shortages and of energy prices on industry location decisions in India. 
 
Transport (Access to external markets):  Locating in a region with good access to markets 
is likely to increase demand for the firm’s products. We find that port distance 
significantly influences location decisions of firms across industry categories. For 
example, in medium technology manufacturing, the coefficient of –0.19 means that a 10 
percent reduction in distance to the nearest international port will be associated with an 
approximately 1.9 percent increase in the city’s attractiveness or potential profitability.   28
Thus, all other things being equal, coastal cities that have international port facilities are 
likely to attract a larger share of investment.  
 
Access to land: We used variations in stamp duty rates to examine the implications of 
problems in access to land on firm location decisions. Our results show that the effective 
stamp duty rate has a significant negative effect on location choices in all industry types.  
 
Access to finance: We find that access to finance has a significant positive effect on 
location decisions. In medium technology manufacturing, the coefficient of 0.06 means 
that a 10 percent reduction in distance to the nearest international port will be associated 
with an approximately 0.6 percent increase in the city’s attractiveness. The results are 
relatively lower for high and low technology manufacturing.  
 
Factor prices: Our prior expectations are that the level of wages should have a negative 
impact on economic activity, once other factors are conditioned out.  The findings from 
our analysis are quite mixed.  We find that cross city variations in wages have strongly 
negative effects on activity in high technology sectors, no effect in medium technology 
sectors, and a positive effect on low technology sectors.
17 A possible reason for this 
ambiguity of the effect of high wages is the difficulty in controlling for the skill 






                                                 
17 For Indonesia the effects are similarly mixed (Henderson and Kuncoro 1996, Deichmann et al 2005).     29
Agglomeration Economies/ clustering effects 
 
For estimating Equation (6), we used the own industry concentration measure 
specified in Equation (1), which is the firm-size adjusted employment for each industry - 
city pair. The estimated parameters are statistically significant and positive for all broad 
sectors under examination.  This suggests that, at this level of industrial and geographic 
aggregation, own-industry concentration or localization economies have a considerable 
impact on location decisions of firms. The results for low technology industries show that 
a 10 percent increase in own industry concentration will increase city’s attractiveness by 
1.1 percent (or a doubling of own industry concentration increases investment 
attractiveness by 11 percent). The estimated effects are higher for medium (18 percent) 
and high (33 percent) technology firms. 
 
Next, we estimate Equation (7) using IV techniques, and instrument own industry 
concentration with the choice of land revenue system. We performed the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test to examine if endogeneity of own industry concentration would have 
adverse effects on OLS estimates. The test results reject the null hypothesis that industry 
concentration is exogenous, suggesting that IV estimates would be preferable to those 
from OLS.
18 While the binary variable is a crude measure, it still is a good predictor of 
industry concentration, and not associated with unobserved sources of natural advantage. 
Results from these estimations are reported in Table 5. We have also included the OLS 
estimates from Table 4 for reference. We find that own industry concentration is still a 
significant and positive determinant of firm location decisions, as reflected in the city-
                                                 
 
18 Test results are provided in Table 5. 
   30
industry attractiveness index. For low and medium technology firms, the IV estimates are 
in fact larger in magnitude that the OLS estimates, which suggests that any endogeneity 
present has a small effect. For high technology manufacturing however, the IV estimate 
is 0.17, which is almost half in magnitude of the coefficient estimated with OLS. Thus, 
we find that own industry clustering has a significant impact on firm location decisions 
even after we take into account potential endogeneity problems in identifying the effects 
of industry clustering / agglomeration economies.  
 
 
5  Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, we examine the relative importance of the local business 
environment and agglomeration economies on location decisions of manufacturing firms 
in India. We disaggregate the business environment into (a) regulatory quality, (b) 
infrastructure quality; and (c) access to inputs such as finance and labor.  We estimate a 
location choice model where a firm optimizes its location decision across Indian cities 
based on a set of observable business environment and agglomeration variables. We use 
firm level data from the Indian Investment Climate Survey (ICS) for India and find that 
the local business environment has a significant bearing on location decisions. Predatory 
enforcement of business regulations and excessive labor regulations have adverse effects 
on location decisions, while availability of infrastructure and access to finance and land 
have positive impacts.  
 
However, agglomeration economies from own industry clustering also positively 
influence firm location decisions. This means that new firms will choose to locate   31
production in areas that are already established centers in their line of business.  An 
important methodological challenge in the estimation of these types of location decision 
models is to separately identify the effects of local agglomeration economies from those 
of unobservable sources of “natural advantage” simply by observing many firms locating 
near one another. To address this concern, we use exogenously instituted land revenue 
institutions set up during the British colonial rule as an instrument to predict industry 
concentration. We find existence of considerable institutional overhang, where historic 
institutions have bearing on current day industry concentration. Further, the impacts of 
agglomeration economies are significant even after addressing endogeneity concerns. 
 
Finally, the implications of our findings are quite relevant for local policy 
initiative designed to attract industry in small and medium sized cities. As both 
agglomeration economies from clustering and the local business environment jointly 
influence business location decisions, smaller or remote cities need to exert relatively 
higher effort in terms of policy reforms to offset costs imposed by adverse geography.   32
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Source  Mean  Std.  Dev.
Pro labor regulation =1; 0 otherwise  Besley and Burgess (2004)  0.263  0.440 
(ln) inspector visits  ICS  2.257  0.489 
(ln) power outages  ICS  2.184  1.143 
(ln) distance to international port  Lall et. al (2004)  1.961  1.081 
Stamp duty rate  World Bank (2004)  7.984  3.483 
(ln) industrial credit  CMIE  7.056  1.617 
(ln) wages  ASI  10.566  0.371 
(ln) own industry concentration (low technology)  ASI  9.616  1.418 
(ln) own industry concentration (medium technology)  ASI  8.605  1.515 
(ln) own industry concentration (high technology)  ASI  7.852  1.556 
Zamindari land revenue system -1; 0 otherwise  Banerjee and Iyer (2005)  0.158  0.365 
   36
 
Table 2: Parameter estimates on interactions in conditional logit 








Pro labor regulation  -0.63  -0.18  -0.58 
 [0.36]+  [0.38]  [0.43] 
(ln) inspector visits  1.14  0.41  0.33 
 [0.34]**  [0.38]  [0.41] 
(ln) power outages  -0.04  0.16  -0.08 
 [0.13]  [0.13]  [0.16] 
(ln) distance to international port  -0.21  -0.24  -0.23 
 [0.12]+  [0.14]+  [0.14]+ 
stamp duty rate  -0.07  -0.06  -0.08 
 [0.04]+  [0.04]+  [0.06] 
(ln) industrial credit  -0.03  -0.06  0.33 
 [0.08]  [0.07]  [0.12]** 
(ln) wages  -0.41  -0.15  0.71 
 [0.40]  [0.51]  [0.63] 
(ln) own industry concentration  0.03  -0.04  -0.2 
 [0.08]  [0.10]  [0.14] 
Observations 26011  22496  14467 
      
χ
2 tests of joint significance   (56.42)** (18.59)* (28.48)** 
      
Standard errors in brackets       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
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Table 3: Industry concentration differences between landlord and other land 
revenue systems 
Revenue System  Low Technology  Medium Technology  High Technology 
Landlord/ zamindari 
system 
20217 3898  1826   
Other land revenue 
systems 
38771 15293 8378 
Note: Numbers in cells are firm size adjusted employment figures (see Equation (1) for 
specification of own industry concentration). 
 








Pro labor regulation  -0.45  -0.43  -0.68 
 [0.01]**  [0.01]**  [0.02]** 
(ln) inspector visits  -0.66  -0.64  -0.8 
 [0.01]**  [0.01]**  [0.01]** 
(ln) power outages  -0.13  -0.15  -0.29 
 [0.00]**  [0.00]**  [0.01]** 
(ln) distance to international port  -0.13  -0.19  -0.46 
 [0.00]**  [0.00]**  [0.01]** 
stamp duty rate  -0.03  -0.03  -0.05 
 [0.00]**  [0.00]**  [0.00]** 
(ln) industrial credit  0.03  0.06  0.01 
 [0.00]**  [0.00]**  [0.00]** 
(ln) wages  0.25  0.01  -0.14 
 [0.01]**  [0.01]  [0.03]** 
(ln) own industry concentration  0.12  0.18  0.34 
 [0.01]**  [0.01]**  [0.01]** 
Constant 1.87  6.51  5.77 
   [0.07]**  [0.10]**  [0.25]** 
R-squared 0.52  0.47  0.48 
Robust standard errors in brackets       
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%       
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Table 5: Factors influencing industry location – IV estimates 
  Low Technology  Medium Technology  High Technology 
   OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Pro labor regulation  -0.45 -0.51 -0.43 -0.39 -0.68 -0.75 
  [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.02]** [0.02]** 
(ln) inspector visits  -0.66 -0.67 -0.64 -0.63  -0.8  -0.82 
  [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.02]** 
(ln) power outages  -0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.29  -0.4 
  [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
(ln) distance to international port  -0.13 -0.13 -0.19 -0.18 -0.46 -0.53 
  [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
stamp duty rate  -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05 
  [0.00]** [0.001]** [0.00]** [0.001]** [0.00]** [0.01]** 
(ln) industrial credit  0.03 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.01  0 
  [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]** [0.00]**  [0.00] 
(ln) own industry concentration  0.12 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.33 0.17 
  [0.002]** [0.01]** [0.01]**  [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
(ln) wages  0.25 0.22 0.01 -0.21 -0.14 0.31 
  [0.01]** [0.01]**  [0.01]  [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
Constant  1.87 1.8 6.51  8.18 5.77 2.89 
  [0.07]** [0.08]** [0.10]** [0.14]** [0.25]** [0.25]** 
   
R-squared 0.52    0.47    0.48    
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for  
endogeneity of industry concentration 95.84  80.07  151.93   
(P-value)  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Robust standard errors in brackets          
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%      
Note: Own industry concentration is endogenous; historical land revenue systems 
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Frequecy of Inspection Visits
Source: ICS 2003; Citywide averages across firms are reported
Figure 1: Frequency of inspection visits across cities
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Appendix 1: Cities covered by the investment climate survey of 2003 
 
Metropolitan cities  Large cities  Smaller cities 
Delhi Pune  Chandigarh  Gwalior 
Mumbai Surat  Cochin  Mangalore 
Kolkata Lucknow  Mysore  Nashik 
Chennai Kanpur  Vijayawanda  Nagpur 
Bangalore Bhopal  Guntur  Thane   
Ahmadabad Ludhana  Gurgaon  Jalandhar 
Hyderabad Indore Panipat  Coimbatore 
 Vadodara  Hubli-Dharwad  Hosur 
 Faridabad  Calicut  Madurai 
   Palakkad  Ghaziabad 
     Noida 
     Howarah 




Appendix 2: Classification of industries into broad categories 
 






Technology  High Technology 
Sugar Garments  Electronics  Drugs 
Food 
Processing  Textiles 
Electrical White 
Goods  Pharmaceuticals 
 Leather  Machine  Tools  Chemicals 
 
Leather 
Products Auto  components  
   Metals       
 